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DISTINGUISHING FICTION FROM REALITY:
THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL AUTO
INDUSTRY
Terence J. Lau*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Association of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) is a
collection of ten countries with a combined population of over 500 million.1
Combined gross domestic product (“GDP”) of all ASEAN countries exceeds
$737 billion.2 ASEAN countries are important trading partners with the
United States. In 2004, fifteen countries accounted for more than seventyfive percent of all foreign trade with the United States.3 Within these fifteen
countries, two are from ASEAN—Malaysia, ranked tenth, and Singapore,
ranked fifteenth.4 The countries are diverse, ranging from a country that
witnessed per capita GDP growth from $427 a year in 1960 to $25,352 in
2004 (Singapore)5 to the world’s most populous Muslim country
(Indonesia).6 GDP growth in the region averaged 5.4 percent in 2005, and is
expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2006.7 Political systems run the gamut
from military dictatorship (Myanmar)8 to “soft authoritarianism”9

_______________________________________________________
* Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration, University of Dayton; Member, Michigan Bar;
J.D., 1998, Syracuse University College of Law; B.A., 1995, Wright State University. Formerly in-house
counsel to Ford Motor Company and former Director for ASEAN Governmental Affairs for Ford
ASEAN Operations. Special thanks to Liam Benham for his friendship and wise counsel in the
development of this article.
1
ASEAN Secretariat, Overview Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Establishment and
Membership,” http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed Feb. 24, 2006).
2
Id.
3
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Exports, Imports,
Year-to-Date December 2004, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0412.html
(last modified Feb. 10, 2005).
4
Id.
5
Singapore Dept. of Statistics, Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices,
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ keystats/hist/gdp.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2006).
6
See President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech, Revisiting our Foreign Policy (Indonesian Council
on World Affairs, May 19, 2005), in The Jakarta Post 7 (May 25, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News
library; The Jakarta Post file). Indonesia’s population, at over 241 million, is behind only the United
States, India, and China. CIA World Factbook, Rank Order—Population,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2006).
7
Krissana Parnsoonthorn, Europeans Urged to Keep ASEAN On Map: Thanong Confident in Economic
Reforms, Bangkok Post (Sept. 23, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; Global News Wire file).
8
The United States State Department describes the Burmese government as ruling with a “pervasive
security apparatus” and with an “extremely poor” human rights record. U.S Dept. of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Burma Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Burma—
2004, http://www.state.gov/g/ drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
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(Singapore and Malaysia) to liberal democracy (Thailand).10 Economically,
the picture is equally scattered. While virtually all member countries claim
to embrace capitalism (Laos remains officially communist even in its
economic system),11 member state economies range from the highly
capitalistic with a tradition of governmental non-interference and
transparency (Singapore)12 to a highly controlled, high import quota and
tariff and non-tradable currency regime (Myanmar).13 ASEAN countries,
while geographically close to each other, seem to share little in common
with each other. In spite of this, ASEAN sought to undertake economic
integration in 1976,14 and the results have been mixed.15
This Article explores the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (“AFTA”)
and its implications for the regional and global auto industry. Section I of
this article provides a brief history of ASEAN and its attempts to integrate
regionally. It outlines the reasons for regional economic integration, and
traces the current literature in this area. Section II provides an overview of
the current auto industry in each of the major auto-producing countries in
ASEAN: Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. It will
also explain Malaysia’s protected auto industry and Malaysia’s attempts to
delay implementation of AFTA, and its neighboring countries’ reactions.
Section III will describe the very first exchange of completely built-up
vehicles (“CBU”) within ASEAN under the precursor to AFTA, the ASEAN
Industrial Cooperation Scheme (“AICO”), and its implications for the future
of ASEAN. Section IV will expand on the concept of economic integration
by describing current efforts by the auto industry to integrate, thus reducing
its costs, increasing quality, and increasing consumer choices. Finally,
Section V of this Article will draw some conclusions about the lessons
learned from the auto industry’s experience with AFTA, and will suggest
that further economic integration will provide ASEAN with a credible and
stable path to future growth even as the ascendant China continues to draw
foreign direct investment from the region.
9
Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights
Performance in Asia, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 75, 76 (2004).
10
D.C. Kennedy, In Search of a Balance Between Police Power and Privacy in the Cybercrime Treaty, 9
Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1 (Fall 2002).
11
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Laos,
http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/2770.htm (accessed Mar.14, 2006).
12
Singapore’s corruption-free government and friendly investment policies have resulted in growth rates
that averaged eight percent between 1960 and 1999. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Singapore, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm (accessed Mar.
14, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Singapore].
13
Myanmar (also known as Burma) has suffered from economic mismanagement that has caused a
downward economic spiral for most Burmese citizens. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Burma, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm (accessed Mar.
14, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Burma].
14
Deborah A. Haas, Student Author, Out of Others’ Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional
Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 Am. U.J. Intl. L. & Policy 809, 813 (Spring 1994).
15
See generally George O. White, III, Student Author, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to Compete
in a Global Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 Tulsa J. Comp. & Intl. L. 177 (2000). See also
Haas, supra n. 14, at 810 (noting that ASEAN “lack[s] a strong record in economic achievement”).
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ASEAN AND ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
A.

Post-War Southeast Asia: ASEAN Forms

In order to understand AFTA, one must examine the historical
context which gave rise to ASEAN. Prior to the Second World War, most
Southeast Asian nations were colonies of European powers.16 Japan’s war
effort had driven up its appetite for raw materials, and Southeast Asia
provided a key source for those materials.17 On December 7, 1941, in
addition to bombing Pearl Harbor, the Japanese also launched military
operations against Malaysia (then Malaya), the Philippines, and Hong
Kong.18 On January 2, 1942, Japanese troops captured Manila.19 Kuala
Lumpur fell on January 11, and Singapore followed on February 15.20
Burma and portions of the Netherlands East Indies quickly followed suit.21
Just as quickly as the Japanese established occupation in Southeast
Asia, Japan began losing ground once the United States joined the war.22
After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Japanese surrender in 1945,
many countries in Southeast Asia sought independence from their former
colonial masters. Indonesia, for example, declared independence from the
Netherlands in 1945, and settled hostilities with the Dutch in 1949.23 Burma
was granted independence from Great Britain in 1948.24 The Philippines
gained its independence from the United States in 1946, a process that
started in 1935 but was interrupted by Japanese occupation.25 Malaysia won
independence from Great Britain in 1957.26 Singapore joined the British
Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah to form the Federation of Malaya in
1963.27 Indonesia objected to this move and severed trade with Malaysia.28
After some friction and negotiations with the central government in Kuala

_______________________________________________________
16

Nicholas Tarling, The Establishment of the Colonial Regimes, in The Cambridge History of Southeast
Asia, Volume Two: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 5, 5-72 (Nicholas Tarling ed., Cambridge U.
Press 1992).
17
A.J. Stockwell, Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires, in The
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume Two: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 329, 330
(Nicholas Tarling ed., Cambridge U. Press 1992).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 331.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 332.
23
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Indonesia,
http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
24
Background Note: Burma, supra n. 13.
25
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Philippines,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
26
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Malaysia,
http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
27
Background Note: Singapore, supra n. 12.
28
For an excellent accounting of this phase of Southeast Asia’s development, see Matthew Jones,
Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961—1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and
the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge U. Press 2002).
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Lumpur, Singapore itself seceded from Malaysia in 1965.29
Amidst this background, ASEAN was formed in 1967 with the
signing of the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok.30 Original member states
included Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore.31 The
short document set forth ASEAN’s goals as accelerating economic growth,
promoting regional security and stability, and expanding trade.32 To carry
out these goals, the Bangkok Declaration created an annual meeting of
Foreign Ministers and a standing committee to carry on the work of
ASEAN.33 In spite of its stated goals, ASEAN’s unspoken objective was to
create stability in the midst of growing communist insurgencies in Vietnam
and Cambodia.34 All parties involved knew that economic progress would
be slow.35
B.

Economic Integration & ASEAN Enlargement

In 1976, ASEAN members for the first time “created practical
programs affecting trade and security.”36 At the ministerial meeting in Bali,
Indonesia that year, the member states signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which established a loose framework for
economic cooperation and development.37 It also enshrined the ASEAN
principle of “[n]on-interference” in the “internal affairs” of other member
states.38 The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed at the same meeting,
stated that the five member states would cooperate in “trade in order to
promote development and growth of new production and trade.”39 These
documents initiated the first experiments with regional integration within
ASEAN, producing various industrial projects, industrial complementation
schemes, and the beginnings of preferential trading rights such as lowered
tariffs.40 None of these initiatives were very successful in creating a
cohesive regional trading bloc.41 Instead, the five member countries started
industrializing their own economies and looked beyond each other to

_______________________________________________________
29

Background Note: Singapore, supra n. 12.
ASEAN Secretariat, supra n. 1.
Id.
32
The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Thailand, 8 August 1967,
http://www.aseansec.org/3628.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006)).
33
Id.
34
Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 329 (HarperCollins
2000).
35
Id. at 330.
36
Haas, supra n. 14, at 813.
37
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976 art. 4-6,
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
38
Id. at art. 2.
39
Declaration of ASEAN Concord Indonesia, 24 February 1976 § B(3)(ii),
http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
40
Haas, supra n. 14, at 816-18.
41
Id.
30
31
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establish major trading partners.42
In 1984, Brunei joined ASEAN after gaining independence from
Great Britain.43 The tiny nation of 350,000 people depends largely on oil
and gas to sustain its economy, and has had very little impact on ASEAN or
efforts to integrate regionally.44
By the mid-eighties, ASEAN countries were enjoying a period of
relative peace and prosperity. Together with policies that attracted foreign
direct investment, most ASEAN countries were enjoying annual growth
rates in excess of six to eight percent.45 Singapore, which had the most
liberalized economy and had developed the most economically, had been
pushing for some time for an ASEAN-wide regional free trade area, but
these efforts had been rebuffed due to suspicion from the other major
members.46 By the late-eighties, however, China and India had begun
liberalizing their economies, and foreign direct investment was diverting to
those large markets.47 Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew worked
with Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to propose the ASEAN Free
Trade Area.48
In 1992, during a summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to
regional trade integration and passed three important trade documents.49
The first was the Singapore Declaration of 1992, which calls for ASEAN
members to “move [to] a higher plane of political and economic
cooperation” and for the establishment of AFTA with the ultimate goal
being tariffs of zero to five percent by 2008.50 The Framework Agreement
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Framework Agreement)
declares that the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (“CEPT”) scheme
would be the main mechanism for establishing AFTA.51 In a nod to the
ASEAN culture of non-interference in domestic matters, the Framework
Agreement specifically states that while all ASEAN member states would
participate in ASEAN “economic arrangements, two or more Member States
may proceed first if other Member States are not ready” to liberalize.52 The
dispute resolution clause of the Framework Agreement is startlingly short

_______________________________________________________
42

Id. at 817.
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Brunei,
http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm (accessed Mar. 8, 2006).
44
Id.
45
Lee, supra n. 34, at 340.
46
Id. at 341.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Jack I. Garvey, AFTA after NAFTA: Regional Trade Blocs and the Propagation of Environmental and
Labor Standards, 15 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 245, 267 (1997).
50
Singapore Declaration of 1992 § 2, http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
51
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation Singapore, 28 January 1992 art.
II(A)(2), http://www.aseansec.org/5125.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
52
Id. at art. I(3).
43

458

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

and equally conciliatory. It states that any differences between ASEAN
members shall “be settled amicably between the parties” and when
necessary, an “appropriate body” may be designated to settle the dispute.53
Finally, the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (“CEPT Agreement”) provides for
the legal framework of tariff reduction for eligible ASEAN-produced
goods.54 The CEPT Agreement applies to all ASEAN member states and all
manufactured goods.55 Originally, Tariffs were to be reduced to between
zero to five percent by 2008.56 Quantitative restrictions and non-tariff
barriers were similarly slated for elimination.57 However, this time frame
was later accelerated to 2003.58
Although the CEPT Agreement was the most significant step
ASEAN had taken to integrate its member economies, it was an agreement
that was riddled with significant escapes for economies concerned about the
pain that often accompanies economic liberalization. The rules of origin, for
example, called for preferential tariffs to be applied to any product “if at
least 40% of its content originates from any Member State.”59 This
requirement was recently modified to permit twenty percent ASEAN
content for purposes of “cumulation.”60 Another provision of the CEPT
Agreement, and one later invoked by Malaysia to protect its domestic auto
industry,61 allowed for an importing country to suspend preferential tariffs
“for such time as may be necessary” when import of a particular product
threatens to cause “serious injury” to sectors producing like or competitive
products in the importing country.62
Under the CEPT Agreement, ASEAN member states categorized
their tariff lines into four general categories. The General Exception List is
to be used only to permanently exclude products for the “protection of
national security, public morals, human, animal or plant life, and articles of
artistic, historic and archeological value.”63 The Sensitive List is to be used

_______________________________________________________
53

Id. at art. IX.
Agreement On The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area Singapore, 28 January 1992, http://www.aseansec.org/5124.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
55
Id. at art. II.
56
Id. at art. IV.
57
Id. at art. V(A).
58
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation art. 1,
http://www.aseansec.org/12369.htm (accessed Mar. 14, 2006).
59
CEPT Agreement, supra n. 54, at art. II(4).
60
Implementing Guidelines for Partial Cumulation Under ASEAN Cumulative Rules of Origin
http://www.aseansec.org/17297.pdf (accessed Mar. 14, 2006). These new guidelines have resulted in a
boost in export value from countries such as Thailand. Petchanet Pratruangkrai, AFTA Trade: Exports
Boosted by Duty Privileges, The Nation (Sept. 8, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; The Nation
file).
61
See infra § III(E).
62
CEPT Agreement, supra n. 54, at art. VI.
63
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update,
http://www.aseansec.org/10342.htm (accessed Mar. 8, 2006).
54
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for unprocessed agricultural products, which are indeed sensitive items for
most ASEAN countries.64 Items on the Sensitive List are given a longer
time frame for liberalization into AFTA.65 The Temporary Exclusion List is
for tariff lines that a government wishes to temporarily shield from trade
liberalization.66 Finally, once an item falls into the Inclusion List, the
member state must grant zero to five percent duty privileges for that item.67
In late 2004, ASEAN announced another acceleration of
liberalization, when the six more developed members of Brunei, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand announced the abolition
of tariffs in the autos, textiles, and electronics sectors by 2007.68 Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were given until 2012 to follow.69 ASEAN
has also announced plans to create an ASEAN Economic Community by
2020.70 Components of this Economic Community include AFTA and an
ASEAN Single Window (a customs initiative to facilitate trade).71 In 2005,
the inaugural East Asia Summit took place, with the goal of creating an East
Asia Free Trade Area.72
C.

Current Literature

Prior literature on AFTA and its role in strengthening ASEAN,
predictably, has focused on AFTA’s genesis. In 1993, shortly after the
Singapore meeting that established AFTA, Kenevan and Winden described
the key AFTA documents in some detail.73 Even in that early stage of
development, Kenevan and Winden warned that excessive exceptions,
unclear definitions, weak dispute resolution mechanisms, and a poorly
defined monitoring institution were all key weaknesses in the AFTA
founding documents.74 Soon thereafter, Haas demonstrated that AFTA was
a response to the growing influence of other trading arrangements,
particularly the European Union and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”),75 and recommended ASEAN “actively strive to
implement a successful economic framework and a harmonized legal
institution.”76 The role that ASEAN might play in a much bigger Asia-

_______________________________________________________
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Amit Chanda, ASEAN Accelerates Pace of Progress Towards Free Trading Regime, World Markets
Analysis (Nov. 29, 2004) (available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file).
69
Id.
70
Mohd Arshi Daud, Summit to Gauge ASEAN’s Attractiveness as Single Economic Entity, Malaysia
Economic News (Dec. 7, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; Malaysia Economic News file).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Recent Development: Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN Free Trade
Area, 34 Harv. Intl. L.J. 224 (1993).
74
Id. at 235.
75
Haas, supra n. 14, at 821.
76
Id. at 867.
65
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Pacific economic grouping was explored by Dichter.77 Dichter suggests that
the development of a large Asia-Pacific economic grouping, founded on
international trade law, would be more effective to removing barriers to free
trade and could “evolve” to provide a forum to resolve non-trade
transnational issues.78 Kiriyama combined “theoretical prediction” with
empirical analysis79 to suggest that AFTA may be flawed because it only
addresses tariff reductions, and true integration requires much more.80 Other
commentators have been critical of AFTA’s lack of a robust and transparent
dispute resolution mechanism81 and suggested that linking trade concessions
to environmental and labor standards might produce a more robust free trade
area.82 Most recently, White has reiterated the argument that AFTA has
tremendous promise as a regional trading area and predicted that AFTA will
prove successful in the long run.83 Bello, however, has stated that, “We had
30 years to build an ASEAN house, and we blew it.”84 He argues that in its
first two decades of existence, ASEAN was hijacked by politics.85 In
essence, he blames AFTA’s lack of success on three factors: a lack of a
common vision on a free trade area, a lack of relevance to industry, and a
lack of effort to make ASEAN a democratic effort involving the people of
ASEAN.86
Thus far, no literature has addressed the success or failure of AFTA
in relation to any specific industry, or the consequences of Malaysia’s
invocation of the AFTA mechanisms for delay of sensitive products or
sectors. Current literature is also silent on what the future holds for AFTA,
especially in light of a proposed ASEAN-China Free Trade area and the
continued march towards bilateral trading agreements by ASEAN’s more
economically advanced countries. This Article seeks to fill those gaps.
III.

OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL AUTO INDUSTRIES

Within the ten member countries of ASEAN, five (Thailand,
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia) have some level of domestic

_______________________________________________________
77
Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. Pa. J. Intl. Bus. L. 99
(1995).
78
Id. at 153.
79
Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Comparative
Institutional Analysis for International Economic Organization, 19 U. Pa. J. Intl. Econ. L. 53, 96 (1998).
80
Id. at 97-99.
81
Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN’s Rubicon: A Dispute Resolution Mechanism for AFTA, 14 UCLA P. Basin
L.J. 147, 189 (1996).
82
Garvey, supra n. 49, at 274.
83
White, supra n. 15, at 199.
84
Walden Bello, Is ASEAN Irrelevant?, BusinessWorld (Philippines) (Dec. 14, 2004) (available in WL,
BUSWLDMAN database).
85
Id.
86
Id.; see also Walden Bello, Can the Philippines “Handle” Globalization?, BusinessWorld
(Philippines) (Jan. 25, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; BusinessWorld file) (indicating a major
problem with ASEAN was indecision on whether to be a stepping stone for global trade or to create a
regional bloc with high tariff walls surrounding the member countries).
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auto manufacturing and foreign direct investment by global auto
manufacturers. Not surprisingly, these five countries also represent the
largest auto markets in the region in terms of vehicle sales. A sixth,
Singapore, has no domestic manufacturing base but vehicle sales are still
running ahead of Vietnam and therefore remain an important market for
manufacturers. Within the countries, there exists a wide range in the level
of sophistication in the respective auto industries. Thailand (with its exportoriented strategy attracting large amounts of foreign direct investment) and
Malaysia (where a large domestic market has allowed a domestic
manufacturer to thrive) represent the most advanced types of manufacturing
in the region, with large-scale vehicle production and research and
development.87 The auto industries in Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam
are smaller and thus largely limited to assembly of completely knockeddown (“CKD”) kits, sourced from other countries. The industries that
emerged in these countries began as governments attempted to force
industrialization through import substitution policies.88
It is not surprising that the world’s major automakers are attracted to
ASEAN. The region attracted more than $20 billion in foreign direct
investment in 2003, a forty-eight percent increase over the previous year.89
The foreign direct investment stock (total amount of foreign direct
investment) in ASEAN is up over eighty-five percent since 1995.90 Over
1.7 million vehicles were sold in the region in 2004, and that number is
forecasted to increase to 2.4 million by 2010.91 AFTA’s promise of lowered
trade barriers is attractive to all carmakers, from South Korea-based
Hyundai-Kia92 to niche luxury producers such as Audi, which announced
plans to build a plant somewhere in Southeast Asia in 2004.93 Indian
automaker Tata, with an eye towards expansion to the rest of Southeast
Asia, is exploring assembling pickups in Thailand.94
Since the
implementation of AFTA tariff rates in 2003, intra-ASEAN trade in auto

_______________________________________________________
87

See e.g. Ready for AFTA and Regional Competition, New Straits Times 16 (Mar. 27, 2005) (available
in LEXIS, News library; New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) file).
Expert Discusses Effects of FTAs on Automotive Industry in Asia, Thai Press Reports (May 6, 2005)
(available in LEXIS, News library; Global News Wire file).
89
Audrina Gan, Case Stories: Southeast Asia Back on Track, The Edge Singapore (Sept. 27, 2004)
(available in LEXIS, News library, the Edge Singapore file).
90
Id.
91
Ford Motor Company Economist Conferences, Speech, South East Asia: If Only There Was Cooperation? (India, Dec. 7, 2005) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Economist Conferences].
92
Johanna Iivonen, Hyundai-Kia Mulling ASEAN Production Operations, World Markets Analysis (Jan.
17, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file); Hyundai Indonesia Upbeat
Over This Year’s 13,500 Cars Target, The Jakarta Post (Feb. 14, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News
Library; Global News Wire file).
93
Lee Peart, Audi Mulls New Car Plant in Southeast Asia, World Markets Analysis (Aug. 10, 2004)
(available in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file).
94
Lee Peart, Tata to Assemble Pick-Ups in Thailand, World Markets Analysis (Apr. 1, 2005) (available
in LEXIS, News library; World Markets Analysis file).
88
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products and services increased fifty-five percent from 2002 to 2003.95 This
section will focus on the five primary manufacturing countries within
ASEAN and explain their various commitments to regional integration.
A.

Thailand

In 2003, Thailand’s economy grew at the second-fastest rate in
ASEAN, posting 6.7 percent GDP growth.96 On the eastern seaboard of
Thailand, close to the deep-sea port of Rayong lies the Eastern Seaboard
Industrial Estate (“Estate”). As one drives into the Estate, a signboard
proclaiming the Estate as the Detroit of the East greets visitors. Here,
General Motors, Ford, BMW, and Toyota have established manufacturing
operations to serve both the burgeoning Thai domestic market as well as
exports to countries all around the world. No discussion of Thailand’s auto
industry would therefore be complete without a discussion of both domestic
and export markets.
Domestically, Thailand’s auto industry grew eighteen percent from
2003 to 2004.97 The industry is the largest in ASEAN, with over 625,000
units sold locally in 2004.98 The industry is predicted to rise to 890,000 by
2010.99 Domestic taxes come in the form of excise tax, interior tax, and
value added tax, which run from zero to fifty percent.100 These taxes distort
the market to favor pickups and pickup-based sport utility vehicles
(“SUV”).101
Thailand already ranks as the world’s second largest producer of
pickup trucks, behind the United States.102 In 2005, the industry produced
over 1 million cars, and in 2006 Thailand will export nearly fifteen percent
of its production.103 The government’s stated goal is to increase that ration
to fifty percent in the next five years.104
Not surprisingly, having the strongest and largest auto industry in
the region has meant that the Thai government has embraced AFTA.
Thailand implemented the five percent AFTA tariff rate for automobiles and
parts in 2003.105 In 2003, Thailand’s intra-ASEAN trade in auto products

_______________________________________________________
95

Economist Conferences, supra n. 91.
Case Stories: Southeast Asia at a Glance, The Edge Singapore (Sept. 27, 2004) (available in LEXIS,
News library; The Edge Singapore file).
97
Economist Conferences, supra n. 91.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
M. Sarawasthi & Yong Soo Heong, WTO’s Big Bang Liberalisation May Affect APs, Malaysia
Economic News (Aug. 12, 2005) (available in LEXIS, News library; Malaysia Economic News file).
103
Id.
104
Wichit Chantanusornsiri, Pact to Help Reach Auto Export Target, Bangkok Post (Aug. 13, 2005)
(available in LEXIS, News library; Global News Wire file).
105
Economist Conferences, supra n. 91.
96

2006]

DISTINGUISHING FICTION FROM REALITY

463

increased ninty-six percent from the prior year.106
The use of Thailand as an export hub is proof positive of decades of
careful government encouragement to establish an industry. In the first five
months of 2005, vehicle exports grew forty-seven percent from the year
prior.107 Toyota, Mitsubishi, and the Ford/Mazda joint venture, Auto
Alliance Thailand, lead as the top three exporters. Even heavy truck
manufacturers such as Mitsubishi’s Fuso truck division use Thailand as an
export hub to the rest of ASEAN.108 Since 2004, Thailand is in line to
receive new auto industry investments totaling $2.2 billion.109
Thailand’s auto industry remains the strongest and most capable
within the region. Aggressive foreign direct investment by both United
States and Japanese manufacturers has created an industry capable of
advanced vehicle manufacturing with quality suitable for exports. Local
parts suppliers have strong capabilities and therefore local content in Thaiproduced vehicles is high, further driving the benefits of an open and liberal
auto policy in the Kingdom.
B.

Philippines

The historical impact of American influence on the Philippine
culture is reflected within the domestic auto market. It is ASEAN’s only
left-hand drive market, and the industry is uniquely characterized by the
Jeepney, a home-made vehicle that serves both large families and functions
as the unofficial answer to a sprawling country’s need for mass public
transportation. As there are no official statistics tracking the Jeepney
manufacturing industry, this portion of this Article will deal only with the
official auto industry.
The domestic industry in the Philippines continues to suffer the
effects of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, even while other industries in the
region have recovered to their pre-crisis levels.110 From 2003-2004, the
industry shrank to 88,400 units, the only industry to actually shrink in
ASEAN.111 The industry is forecast to increase to merely 119,000 by
2010.112 Vehicles in the Philippines are subject to excise and value added
taxes in the range of two to sixty percent.113
The number of vehicles sold in the Philippines is too small to
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sustain domestic manufacturing in a liberalized AFTA environment, and
therefore an export strategy is key to the survival of auto assembly plants in
the Philippines. Implementing AFTA on time in 2003 with a five percent
tariff rate has assisted the Philippines in establishing an export strategy.114
In 2003, the first year of full AFTA implementation, the Philippines’ level
of intra-ASEAN trade in auto products increased sixty-eight percent from
the prior year.115
Philippines’ auto industry is characterized by a weak domestic
market that, alone among its peers, has yet to fully recover from the effects
of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998. This weak domestic demand has
forced many manufacturers and suppliers to trim back their plans for the
Philippines. In spite of this, low World Trade Organization (WTO) tariffs
on components and vehicle CKD kits have attracted some major automakers
to the country. Some levels of exports have started, and the industry
remains poised for recovery. Weak political institutions and a long-term
lack of cohesion among government leaders, however, continue to threaten
long term stability and investor confidence.
C.

Indonesia

Indonesia, like its regional counterparts, has been cultivating a local
auto industry for over thirty years. Political turmoil and economic upheaval,
however, have robbed Indonesia of the similar success that Thailand has
enjoyed. An ill-fated attempt to create a national car along the likes of
Malaysia’s Proton failed when the Japanese and American governments
protested to the WTO.116 While vehicle assembly is making a nice recovery
in Indonesia, supplier capability for complex parts remains a problem.117
The local market is dominated by van and utility multipurpose vehicles, and
thus far automakers that have announced AFTA export intentions for
Indonesia have focused their efforts on that class of products.118 Japanese
manufacturers have managed their investments well and look poised to take
advantage of regional economic integration in Indonesia. Vehicle sales in
2005 were thirty percent higher than in 2004.119 The domestic market is
expected to top 500,000 in 2005, and reach 750,000 by 2009.120
Domestically sold vehicles are subject to a luxury tax of up to seventy-five
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percent.121
D.

Vietnam

Among ASEAN member economies, Vietnam’s has been the fastest
growing for a number of years, posting 7.3 percent GDP growth in 2003 and
an estimated 7.2 percent in 2004.122 The auto industry is regulated by the
granting of licenses by the government. Thus far, there are fourteen vehicle
manufacturing joint ventures, eleven operational and three more
underway.123 In the first half of 2005, the domestic market reached 16,000
units, an increase of twenty-six percent from the prior year.124 For the full
year, Vietnam is expected to record sales of 41,700 units.125 The industry is
expected to reach 54,000 by 2010.126 Despite the low volumes, vehicle
prices in Vietnam are among the highest in the world.127 Vehicles sold in
Vietnam are subject to a Special Consumption Tax of up to sixty percent
along with a ten percent value added tax.128 In 2005, the latest entry into the
market, Vinaxuki, commenced operations.129
AFTA integration remains a problem for Vietnam. Vietnam
requested, and received, a two-year delay on reducing the import of auto
parts from Thailand to 2008.130 In return, Vietnam agreed to reduce tariffs
on other lines, including livestock and electrical products.131
The
government remains committed to reducing tariffs on CBU vehicles under
AFTA, starting with a reduction to twenty percent in 2008.132 Shortfalls in
customs revenue, however, will likely be offset by increases in internal taxes
such as the Special Consumption Tax, currently set at forty percent.133
E.

Malaysia

Malaysia is a critical auto market in ASEAN. Total vehicle sales in
the first eight months of 2004 rose fourteen percent to over 312,000 units.134
This places Malaysia as the second-largest market in ASEAN, and the
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largest for passenger cars. In 2005, the industry is expected to sell 520,000
units.135 By 2010, the industry is expected to rise to 639,000 units.136 If
Malaysia fully implemented AFTA, a host of car companies would be
interested in expansion plans there.137 Unfortunately, other considerations
have meant that those plans are still collecting dust on a bookshelf.
Malaysia’s domestic auto industry is dominated by Proton, a
national carmaker owned by the government. Protectionist government
measures have meant that Proton traditionally enjoyed market share in
excess of sixty percent.138 This share dropped to forty-five percent in 2004,
as aggressive price-cutting by Japanese and Korean automakers enabled
more Malaysians to purchase non-Proton vehicles. In 2005, the company’s
goal was to increase market share back to fifty percent,139 but analysts
predicted a further decline in market share to below thirty-five percent.140
When Proton’s management141 and dealer network142 complained that the
government was not doing enough to protect it from foreign competition,
outspoken Minister of International Trade and Industry Datuk Seri Rafidah
Aziz said that the government had always taken steps to protect Proton’s
interest since it began.143 Aziz also freely admits that whenever Malaysia
was forced to reduce tariffs, it engaged in price “simulation” in the market
so that there was a sizeable difference between the price of imported and
Proton-manufactured vehicles.144
Proton’s success in an open, liberalized trading environment hinges
on its ability to become globally competitive.145 Tariff and non-tariff
measures may protect its market share, but without access to critical new
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technologies and larger markets for economies of scale,146 it risks being
inundated should Malaysia liberalize.147 One solution would be to find a
partner in a global automaker. Throughout 2003 and 2004, the government
made no secret of its plans to locate a partner for Proton.148 Germany’s
Volkswagen (VW) emerged as an early suitor, and the possibility of a tie-up
was greeted with cheer from investors.149 VW would provide technology,
products, capital, and a distribution network outside Malaysia for Proton
products.150 In return, VW would obtain a foothold in the largest passenger
car market in ASEAN.151 Proton, which has excess capacity in its plants,
could assemble VW models for distribution in the region.152 By mid-2005,
discussions between Proton and VW were at a standstill.153 In early 2006,
discussions between the two companies collapsed amidst reports that
Proton’s management refused to cede management control to VW.154
Proton’s share price dropped more than ten percent on the news.155
A second carmaker, Perodua, has close ties to Toyota. In 2004,
Toyota’s Indonesian subsidiary began shipping CKD kits of its Avanza
multi-utility vehicle for final assembly by Perodua in Malaysia.156 Perodua,
which is twenty-five percent owned by Toyota’s Daihatsu division, has also
invested heavily in expanding production capacity in anticipation of AFTA
compliance.157 Analysts agree that Perodua is in much better shape to face
AFTA than Proton.158
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In 2000, Malaysia sought to delay transferring auto tariff lines to the
Inclusion List under CEPT.159 In typical collaborative ASEAN fashion, the
member states passed the Protocol Regarding the Implementation of the
CEPT Scheme Temporary Exclusion List, which permitted member
countries to delay implementing AFTA for any product whose transfer into
AFTA “would cause or have caused real problems.”160 Malaysia promptly
invoked the Protocol to delay transferring over 218 auto-related items into
its Inclusion List.161 Instead of the five percent rate by 2006 as mandated by
AFTA, Malaysia sought to delay implementing a twenty percent rate until
2005.162 Assuming a five percent annual step-down, Malaysia would not
reach a five percent tariff rate until 2008.163 Details of how Malaysia would
implement the delay were scarce, and even by late 2004, the government
had yet to announce how it would liberalize the auto industry.164 Industry
executives were left with no choice but to adopt a wait-and-see approach on
how to include Malaysia in their regional integration plans.165
Efforts by Malaysia to delay implementation of AFTA brought an
angry response from its neighbors, especially Thailand166 and Indonesia.167
By the end of 2004, however, as Malaysia appeared ready to lower tariff
rates to twenty percent, Thailand was seeking ways to lower the rhetoric
with Malaysia.168
In 2005, Malaysia carried out its promise to lower the tariff rate for
CBU vehicles to twenty percent.169 The import duty on some classes of
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vehicles went from 190 percent to twenty percent under AFTA.170 The
long-awaited emergence of the Malaysian Automotive Policy (“MAP”),
however, continued to be elusive.171 The government continued to insist on
protectionist measures by simultaneously increasing the excise tax on
imported vehicles.172 In some classes of vehicles, excise duty went from
100 percent to 250 percent.173 Proton, however, retained a pricing and profit
advantage because of an excise tax rebate.174 The most controversial
measure was to retain the approval process for importing vehicles, a process
that allocated the permits to local bumiputeras (persons of Malay
ethnicity).175 The requirement for an approval permit in order to import
vehicles ensures that imported vehicles, in spite of lower tariffs, remain
much more expensive than Proton vehicles.176 The use of approval permits
has been roundly criticized, even in Malaysia, as an opportunity for
cronyism,177 a charge the Minister for Industry, Aziz, soundly denies.178
The new policy was greeted with dismay by both Proton179 and nonnational car companies.180 Toyota threatened a pullout, and Nissan placed
expansion plans on hold.181 Rather than lead to lower vehicle prices and
therefore higher industry volumes, the industry braced itself for higher
vehicle prices.182 By 2008, Malaysia may be forced to abandon the use of
approval permits when certain provisions of the WTO agreement come into
force.183
In the meantime, serious in-fighting at Proton led to at least two
attempts to displace Proton’s CEO, a protégé of former Prime Minister
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Mahathir Mohammed.184 After a public war of words with the government
wherein he complained that the government was not doing enough to protect
Proton,185 he was forced out by Proton’s board in mid-2005.186 In light of
these management problems at Proton, the government rushed to reassure
the public that Proton’s performance in getting ready for AFTA
liberalization would proceed on-course.187 Export plans, seen as critical to
Proton’s survival, remained tentative.188 Most recently, the government has
continued its push to prepare the domestic auto sector for increased
liberalization and competition.189 The new Malaysian Prime Minister,
Abdullah Badawi, has promised that protection for Proton will eventually
end.190 By late 2005, the government was still fine-tuning the various
instruments of trade policy at its disposal in an attempt to comply with its
trade obligations while still helping Proton survive,191 including giving into
pressure to phase out the controversial Approval Permit requirement.192
Malaysia’s haltering entry into AFTA is emblematic of the
problems AFTA has had generally. In lowering tariff barriers as a result of
AFTA, for example, Malaysia has also lowered tariffs for non-AFTA
countries. By doing so, cheap imports from South Korea have found a
stronghold in Malaysia’s robust car market. Indeed, in 2005, there were
twenty-one vehicle models sold in Malaysia that were not part of AFTA.193
If AFTA’s promise for the auto industry is to be realized, all vehicle markets
should maintain common and high external tariffs to allow the ASEAN
markets time to develop.194 Although this lesson appears lost on the
Malaysians, they did agree to lower tariffs on CKD kits from Japan as part
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of their 2005 free trade agreement with Japan..195
IV.

USING AICO TO TRADE CBU VEHICLES196

As previously discussed, the implementing mechanism for AFTA is
the CEPT Agreement. As tariff lines move into the CEPT Inclusion List,
their tariffs drop to zero to five percent. The full implementation for AFTA
was scheduled for January 1, 2003. Prior to that date, it was possible for
companies to use another mechanism, AICO, to obtain zero to five percent
preferential tariff rates. This section of the Article details how one
automaker, Ford, used AICO to its advantage in 2002 in order to obtain
duty-free privileges for complete vehicles one year ahead of AFTA’s
implementation.197
The AICO Agreement198 was signed by ASEAN member states in
1996.
The objectives of the Agreement were to promote increased
ASEAN industrial production, closer ASEAN integration, increased
investment, and increased industrial complementation.200
The most
attractive feature of AICO was that, if granted, the company involved would
receive a zero to five percent tariff rate ahead of AFTA implementation.201
Member states were granted the authority to decide each AICO application
individually.202 Although not mentioned specifically, AICO was targeted at
the auto industry, and more specifically, at the Japanese automakers that
already had established complementation networks.203 From its inception,
AICO was fraught with difficulty for the industry, especially as each
Member State was given complete discretion on the process for approving
AICO applications.204 In 1997, there were only seven applications filed.205
By 1999, forty-six applications had been filed, of which thirty-three
involved manufacturing in Thailand.206 Of those thirty-three, twenty-eight
199
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were from the auto industry.207
The use of AICO to trade CBU vehicles, as opposed to parts, was
unprecedented in 2002.208 In Ford’s estimation, the AICO would also bring
intangible benefits along with the immediate tariff reductions. At the time,
automakers were nervous about AFTA’s viability for the auto industry.
Malaysia had delayed implementation, and there was concern that the
Philippines and Indonesia, which had much to lose in light of Thailand’s
capability as an export hub, would also delay.209 The use of the AICO was
therefore seen as a means of reassuring domestic assemblers and parts
makers that AFTA, if fully implemented, would lead to success for all
countries through the use of regional integration.
Like most automakers, Ford’s strategy in the mid- to late-1990s was
to regard each market in ASEAN as a separate emerging market poised for
solid future growth. This national market view led to the establishment of
assembly plants in multiple locations throughout the region, specifically
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. By 1999, all four plants
were producing identical vehicles. Under a regional integration strategy, the
plants would instead focus on making one or two products, and then trade
the vehicles with other plants.210 Ideally, Malaysia would make the
passenger car product since Malaysia was the biggest passenger car market
in ASEAN. The Thai affiliate would produce pickup trucks since Thailand
was the biggest pickup market in ASEAN. The Philippines would then
produce the SUV product, as it was the newest plant and the Philippines had
the lowest duty rates on parts from Japan and the United States (where the
SUV was sourced from). If Ford could realize these location-specific
advantages, it would realize an AFTA strategy that would lead to greater
volume, more consumer choice, and lower costs.
Thus, in 2001, Ford filed an AICO application with the
governments of Thailand and the Philippines for AICO privileges to apply
to CBU vehicles.211 Under the AICO application, Ford proposed to move
production of its passenger car from Thailand to the Philippines.212 It also
sought to introduce a new SUV, the Ford Escape, by building it in the
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Philippines and exporting it to Thailand.213 In return, Ford proposed ceasing
production of its pickup truck in the Philippines, and importing the pickup
truck, a new SUV product, as well as parts and components from its Thai
affiliate.214 After running into some initial resistance,215 the AICO was
approved by both governments,216 and Ford became the first automaker in
the region to trade CBU vehicles at zero to five percent tariff rates. In doing
so, Ford also persuaded the Philippine government to adopt export
incentives to encourage other automakers to export CBU vehicles from the
Philippines.217
Ford Philippines exported 10,000 CBU vehicles in 2004, and
expects to export more than 14,000 in 2005.218 Exported vehicles include
the Escape SUV and Focus sedan to Thailand and Indonesia.219 The AICO
scheme’s relevance, in the meantime, has not diminished. It can still be
used by companies, for example, to realize preferential tariffs in countries
such as Vietnam and Malaysia. Toyota recently announced a study to use
AICO to trade passenger and commercial vehicles between Thailand and
Malaysia.220
V.

CURRENT INTEGRATION EFFORTS

By 2005, most automakers in ASEAN were using the AFTA
mechanisms to export from their base factories. Ford, of course, was
building on its AICO project to expand trade between its Thai and
Philippine affiliates. Nissan produces the Liberty multi-purpose vehicle in
Thailand for export to Southeast Asia.221 It also produces the X-Trail
compact SUV in Indonesia for export.222 German automaker BMW, on the
other hand, has been slower to take advantage of AFTA. It owns only one
assembly plant in the region, in Rayong, Thailand.223 The company sold
13,000 vehicles in ASEAN in 2004, but the Thai plant only manufactures
for the Thai market, while local assemblers build vehicles for the Malaysian
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and Indonesian markets.224 A trial run of exports from Thailand to
Indonesia was successful, and the company has publicly stated its intent to
use Thailand as a base to serve all of ASEAN.225 Even exporting in very
small volumes can prove feasible within AFTA, as France’s Peugeot
recently demonstrated with a shipment of twenty-four vehicles from its
Indonesian subsidiary to Thailand.226 Peugeot also has plans to export
vehicles from Malaysia.227 Of course, these vehicles must still satisfy
AFTA’s forty percent local-content requirement to qualify for duty-free
privileges, and it is hard to imagine a localization program for such small
volumes.
Toyota, which owns multiple plants throughout the region, has also
started using AFTA to ship CBU vehicles between countries. In 2004,
Toyota began exporting its Avanza van product from its Indonesian affiliate
to Malaysia in CKD form, and as a CBU vehicle to Thailand.228
Tiny Suzuki has also started to use AFTA to take advantage of
export opportunities. In 2005, it began exporting its all purpose vehicle
from Indonesia.229
VI.

INTEGRATING OUTSIDE ASEAN AND CLOSING THOUGHTS

In the wake of collapsing global trade talks at the WTO, ASEAN
appears determined to move forward with economic integration. In
November 2004, there were seventy-eight ongoing trade negotiations around
the world, thirty within Asia, and a further twenty-two involving Asia.230 In
the initial days of AFTA, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir warned that
bilateral trade agreements may weaken AFTA by providing a “backdoor”
for goods to enter an ASEAN member country and then be re-exported to
other ASEAN member countries, exploiting the loose rules-of-origin to take
advantage of preferential tariffs.231 His worst fears may be coming true.
This integration is happening on both bilateral (between an ASEAN member
country and a non-ASEAN country) and multilateral (between ASEAN
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collectively and a non-ASEAN country) levels. Multilateral discussions
include China, India,232 Japan,233 South Korea, New Zealand, and
Australia.234 Malaysia is negotiating free trade agreements with the United
States and Japan, and has proposed bilateral agreements with Australia,
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.235 Singapore has signed bilateral trading
agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States.236
Thailand has attempted bilateral trading agreement discussions with Japan,
but progress proved rocky because of concerns of imported cars from Japan,
while the sensitive topic of rice has been avoided altogether.237 Auto
industry executives have warned that even an agreement to reduce tariffs on
autos would result in a one-sided deal in favor of Japan, as the Japanese
would implement non-tariff barriers to keep Thai exports from the market.238
Japanese automakers promised to invest an additional $1 billion into
Thailand if AFTA was signed.239 In late summer 2005, the governments
announced a tentative deal.240 Indonesia has noticeably refrained from
engaging in any discussions on bilateral trading agreements.
As integration efforts proceed, opening a crack in the wall
surrounding ASEAN, especially with regards to China, appears to pose
some risks.241 Already, Chinese automaker Chery has announced plans to
export vehicles from China to Malaysia and perhaps from there to other
parts of Southeast Asia.242 Fellow automaker Geely has also announced
plans to establish operations in Malaysia to take advantage of AFTA.243
China’s role in this economic expansion causes the most angst among
commentators. The free trade area being contemplated between ASEAN
and China appears to be a “half open model,” characterized by grossly
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disproportionate advantages to China.244
Commentators have observed that part of ASEAN’s problem is that
for the more industrialized member states, their trading partners have always
been non-ASEAN countries such as the United States, European Union, and
Japan.245 This fact alone could lead AFTA to a state of forced irrelevance.246
The experience of the auto industry in ASEAN, however, has demonstrated
that AFTA has critical implications for the region. Foreign direct
investment in the auto industry in the region, for example, has exploded
after the 2003 implementation of AFTA.247 Ironically, one of the most
sensitive of the sectors that national governments have long sought to
protect is also the sector with the strongest desire for AFTA integration.
Product specialization and market cross-shipments demonstrate the clear
benefits of AFTA to all stakeholders: governments, assemblers, suppliers,
and customers. The recent proliferation of free trade agreement negotiations
poses an alarming risk to the development of a sustainable ASEAN
economic community. The lack of standards harmonization and distortive
tax policies that suppress consumer demand further complicate the dream
for a common market. As ASEAN begins to look outwards for future trade
ties, it may do well to remember these lessons.
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